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Abstract
Recent historical research indicates that ritualistic dueling had a rational
basis. Basically, under certain social and economicconditions, individuals must
…ght in order to maintain their personal credit and social standing. A model
of the duel, therefore, can be constructed. We model the duel as a two–players
sequential game. This paper shows that the optimal strategy of each player
depends upon the value of three parameters, namely, “cost of …ghting,” “cost
of shame”, and “value of courage.”
Keywords: Duel, Noncooperative game, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilib-
rium.
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11 Historical Background
The Vice President of the United States …red his pistol. The bullet found its mark,
the abdomen of a political foe, a former Secretary of Treasury and the father of
American capital markets. The unfortunate target, Alexander Hamilton, lingered
before expiring. The assailant, Aaron Burr, did not go to jail; he returned to the
nation’s capital to preside over the United States Senate. The year was 1804. Just
two years later, a future President of the United States, Andrew Jackson, took a
bullet to the chest from just eight paces away. Bleeding profusely, but still on his
feet, Jackson took deliberate aim at his opponent, …red, and destroyed him. Jackson
too evaded jail. Those two deadly assaults, and thousands of others like them, were
either legal or at least publicly sanctioned; they were duels between gentlemen of
equal social standing, not the actions of rogues or brigands (Holland 1997).
Duels, highly ritualized, often mortal confrontations between two principal com-
batants, seem to the modern eye, and indeed to the eyes of many anti-dueling con-
temporaries, to be barbarous, irrational a¤airs. For example, Victorian era Virginian
Robert Reid Howison called dueling a form of private war that “originated in the
wicked vindictive passions and propensities of fallen human nature.” Only when the
“Kingdom of Christ shall be established in all hearts,” he argued, will dueling cease
(Howison, 1924). Similarly, many Canadians saw dueling as heathen and barbaric
(Morgan, 1995:558). The fact that most duels seemed to be fought over trivial mat-
ters, “the drop of a hat” in the words of one scholar, further damns the institution
to the realm of the irrational (Holland, 1997). Dueling, in other words, at …rst seems
to be more the realm of moralists, historians, philosophers, psychologists, or perhaps
sociobiologists, than of economists. Indeed, until now, game theorists have ignored
dueling, in sense of pursing a model to investigate the motivation to engaging in a
duel.1
A closer examination of the duel, however, exposes its rational core. For all intents
and purposes, dueling has ended, yet no one is under the impression that a religious
revival, or a fundamental change in human nature, caused the institution’s demise.
Interestingly, the twentieth-century’s most barbarous …gure, Adolf Hitler, vigorously
opposed dueling (Combs, 1997). If one of history’s most depraved humans opposed
dueling, causative factors other than human depravity must be at play!
Duels, in short, stemmed from con‡icts over resources, sometimes tangible re-
sources, like land, lucrative government o¢ces, market share, or women (Morgan,
1995: 535-536), but usually intangible ones. The intangible nature of the resource
con‡ict underlying most duels has long obscured the root cause of this otherwise
1There exists many game theoretic models that deal with dueling. However, unlike in our model,
in these models a “duel game” is a timing game in which players have a gun and decide the right
moment to …re a shot. Research on games of timing have been done by many researchers. See,
for example, Blackwell (1948), Restrepo (1957), Kurisu (1983) Radzik (1988). For a survey on this
literature see Kurisu (1991).
2inexplicable explosion of violence. In the best recent treatments of dueling, Green-
berg (1990) and Morgan (1995) demonstrate that duelists sought to defend their
“honour.” Other scholars (Billacois, 1990; Keiser, 1990), as well as contemporaries
(Anon., 1830), have made similar claims. Greenberg and Morgan, however, per-
suasively argue that honor was not a meaningless term or an ambiguous catch-all;
it essentially meant creditability, even creditworthiness. Honor, Morgan notes, was
synonymous with …nancial responsibility (543). Gentlemen did not shoot each other
over trivial matters; they fought when they were accused of lying, or of presenting a
false face to the public. Seemingly bizarre behavior, like gently tugging on a political
or commercial opponent’s nose, was a major o¤ense because it symbolized an e¤ort to
unmask a liar. Seen in this light, duels over seemingly trivial matters, like an o¤hand
statement about the potential authenticity of P.T. Barnum’s “Feejee Mermaid,” take
on a more rational cast.
Dueling thrived when and where credit markets were highly personal in nature,
like early modern Europe, colonial America, the antebellum South, and late nine-
teenth century Mexico. Where credit markets were more impersonal and formalized,
like the postbellum North, Nazi Germany, and much ofthe globe today, dueling seems
like an irrational aberration. Where …nancial intermediaries make most lending de-
cisions, borrowers’ objective …nancial situation is paramount. Economies of scale
and relatively low transaction costs allow modern lenders to rely on credit histories,
revenue statements, and balance sheets to screen loan applicants. Personal credit
markets, however, made much more subjective decisions based more on outward ap-
pearance than …nancial fact. “Gentlemen,” were more likely than non-gentlemen to
receive loans from personal lenders.
All men, like all businesses, needed credit. Southerngentlemen, for example, often
possessed tremendous assets, usually very illiquid ones, but also tremendous liabilities
(Breen, 1987). Like banks short on cashreserves, Southerngentlemencould not su¤er
any attack on their credit, lest their liability holders make repayment demands that
could not be met. None other than Thomas Je¤erson was a lifelong bankrupt who
adroitly stayed a step ahead of his creditors by borrowing from Peter to pay Paul
(Sloan, 1985). Personal creditors would lend to gentlemen when banks would not;
Je¤erson’s disdain for banks may be linked to that fact.
A man who lost his honor, who was no longer a gentleman, would no longer be
worthy of credit. His personal fortune was thus jeopardized as he might be forced to
sell assets at unpropitious times in order to meet the demands of his liability holders.
Attacks upon his honor, therefore, were hardly trivial a¤airs; they struck at the very
heart of his business and personal fortune. A man who would face death because of
a few words would rightly be called a fool, it so too might a man who allowed a few
words to destroy his livelihood.
Duels, after all, were emotional, but not passionate, a¤airs. They were not bar-
room brawls or spontaneous gun…ghts. They were, instead, very calculated events
that might take place days, weeks, or even months after the initial a¤ront. Typically,
3one party accused another of being a liar, coward, a “Byronic youth,” or otherwise
unworthy of the title of gentleman, i.e. uncreditworthy (Howison, 1924: 238). The
accused party then discussed the situation with trusted friends to decide if the ac-
cusation was damaging. If put forth by a social inferior, it clearly was not, and
the exchange would end. Under usual circumstances, a poor man could not judge
the creditworthiness of a rich man, most believed, and in such a case dignifying the
accusation with a response was not considered prudent. If the accuser was another
gentleman, however, negotiations had to commence. Working through an agent, the
accused sought to persuade the accuser to withdraw, modify, or explain away his
damaging comments2 If the accuser refused, the accused had to decide whether to
su¤er the attack on his honor and credit or to challenge the accuser to duel (Anon,
1830:75). The accuser was now on the hot plate. If he refused the challenge, he
would e¤ectively dishonor himself by tacitly admitting his accusations to be false.
He would have admitted that he was a liar, a man unworthy of credit. Sometimes
the public physically attacked men who refused to duel; other times, they merely
abused with words and public postings proclaiming him a LIAR, a COWARD, and
a SCOUNDREL (Morgan, 1995:549-550). If he accepted the challenge, somebody’s
blood was almost certain to be spilled.
The challenged chose the weapons, time, and place of the encounter. Other rules,
such as the distance between the shooters, the number of shots allowed, and other
details, were drawn up, signed, and sealed. Even at this point, third parties sought,
often vainly, to di¤use the situation. Often the best a friendcould do was to act as the
combatant’s “second,” essentially a referee charged with ensuring that the contract
was ful…lled and that this deadliest of games was fairly played.
As far as anyone can tell, the chanceofsurviving aduel was 50percent. Sometimes
both men walked o¤ the …eld unscathed. Sometimes, however, both men died, like
when Virginians William Thornton and Francis Conway slaughtered each other in
1817 at “Alum Spring Rock,” near Fredericksburg (Howison, 1924:234). In most
recorded cases, though, one man left the …eld alive and the other dead or dying.
Although colleges occasionally expelled students for dueling (Richmond Examiner, 9
April 1803), most duelists faced no sanctions, legal or social, for their actions. Juries
routinely allowed the few duelists who were brought to trial o¤; they apparently took
the defendants’ claims of “self-defense” seriously (Morgan, 1995:529). Elsewhere,
principals and seconds, often the only witnesses to the duel, argued that deaths and
injuries were “accidents” (Piccato, 1999).
Duelists followed elaborate rules designed to keep the contests as fair as possible.
2For example, R.O. Grayson, the agent of William & Mary College student Peyton Smith, at-
tempted to convince J.P. Holmes, whom Smith had publicly called a “Dd Fool,” to admit that he and
Smith were too drunk for any of their comments to be taken seriously. Holmes, after consultation
with friends, demurred, demanding that Smith admit that he had lied. Grayson ”remonstrated that
such admission was without the power of any man”; such an admission would ruin Smith’s business
career before it began. Soon thereafter, Holmes killed Smith in a duel (Evans, 1935).
4If the contest seemed lopsided, the duel could be called o¤ or terms of peace rapidly
concluded. Legend has it, for example, that when challenged to a duel Abraham
Lincoln chose cavalry sabers, as was his right. The challenger immediately recognized
that the gangly former woodcutter would make short work of him. He promptly
settled for Lincoln’s rather dubious claim that he had meant nothing “personal” when
he called the challenger a smelly, foolish, liar (Holland, 1997). Most combatants,
however, fought it out with single shot, smooth bore pistols. They were hardly
the most accurate or reliable …rearms ever devised. Through repeated practice, one
could develop some skill with them, but hitting the target remained to a large extent
a function of luck and nerve under …re. It was also possible to survive a direct hit
from such a weapon, as Andrew Jackson did. Duelists in many areas, including late
nineteenth century Mexico, tended to eschew more modern …rearms as too accurate
and deadly (Piccato, 1999). Duels were supposed to occur between equals; where skill
mattered, equality was lost, and dueling became mere gun…ghting, as in the “Wild
West.”
The honor, and hence the creditworthiness, of the winning duelist was upheld and
even enhanced. Accusations against his character, even if correct, were erased. The
winner of a duel had shown himself to be a manly, courageous leader, capable of
defending his property, by force if necessary. Who better to trust with one’s money?
With high political o¢ce? The loser lost his life. That was a small price to pay,
however, to maintain one’s honor and credit. The man who should have dueled, but
did not, was the biggest loser of all. He kept his life, but for many it was hardly a life
worth living. His social status and credit gone, such a man, a mere coward in the eyes
of the community, could expect little in the way of public life – no awards, no o¢ces,
and no respect. According to one historian, in both America and Europe “it was
political suicide to su¤er an a¤ront without challenging, or to decline a challenge”
(Holland, 1997). In nations as diverse as Prussia and Mexico, avoiding a duel was,
in the words of another expert, “a social death sentence” (Piccato, 1999). This
explains why lawmakers who triedto sanction duelists did so by banning participants,
combatants and their seconds, from public o¢ce, by extracting huge …nes from them,
or by condemning them to gibbeting – death followed by public rotting of the body
(Greenberg, 1990:67). The idea was to make the expected cost of dueling the same
as the expected cost of not dueling – loss of honor, wealth, and life itself.
Such laws, however, never worked to prevent dueling until public sentimentshifted
and allowed prosecutions for the crime. Public sentiment shifted when dueling no
longer made rational sense, when institutional credit markets supplanted personal
ones. Banks and other …nancial intermediaries do not care if their borrowers are
liars or scoundrels, just as long as they ful…ll their loan contracts. They prefer
that their debtors live, at least until their mortgages are paid in full. In such a
world, dueling begins to look absurd. Dueling died quickly in the North, where
…nancial intermediation was much more advanced than in the South. As early as
1820, Northerners like Mordecai Manual Noah ridiculed dueling as “false honour.”
5Noah noted, wrongly, that Southerners fought over sneezing “too loud” and other
“trivial causes” (NewYork National Advocate, 12 November 1819). Evenat this early
date, some in the commercializing North could no longer see the credit implications
underlying most duels.
If challenging someone to a duel was a rational behavior in some circumstances,
then it should be possible to model it. No one, to our knowledge, has yet done so,
probably because economists tend to stress present-day issues. Of course, if we are
correct, under the right circumstances dueling could return.
2 The Model
This game is played by two (until proved otherwise) honorable men. Player 1 (the
accuser hereafter), makes an accusation against the honor of player 2 (the accused
hereafter). The game starts after this o¤ense is made and the interaction between
the two players is set as a three stages game which runs as follows.
stage 1 (The withdraw stage): The accuser decides whether or not
to withdraw the accusation.
stage 2 (The challenge stage): After observing the accuser’s action in
stage 1, the accused decides whether or not to challenge the accuser to a duel.
If there is no challenge, and consequently no duel, the game ends in stage 2.
Otherwise, nothing happens until stage 3.
stage 3 (The acceptance stage): If the accused poses a challenge, the
accuser has to decide whether or not to accept the challenge.
The game in its extensive form is shown in …gure 1.
The Strategy Space The accuser is called upon to play in three di¤erent informa-
tion sets, namely information set 1;3;5 (see …gure 2a). Information set 1 correspond
to the initial node. In this information set the accuser has two possible actions. Let
A1 be the set of actions available in information set 1, such that:
A1 = fwithdraw, not withdrawg
The information sets 3 and 5 are represented by the two single nodes in stage 3.
The accuser has two possible actions in each information set in stage 3: Let A3 and
A5 be the sets of actions available in information set 3 and 5 respectively, such that
A3 = A5 = faccept, not acceptg
Player 2, the accused, moves on stage 2 only and has two information sets, infor-
mation set 2 and 4 (see …gure 2b). There are two possible actions in each information
set. Thus, we can de…ne A2 = A4 as the set of actions available to player 2 such that
A2 = A4 = fchallenge;not challengeg
6We are now left to discuss players’ strategies. A strategy space is a complete
description of the actions taken by each player at each information set if he/she is
called to play there.
The strategy space of player 1, the accuser, is given by
S1 = fs1;s2;:::;s8g
where si = (a11;a13;a15) such that i = 1;:::8 and a11 2 A1, a13 2 A3, a15 2 A5 are
the actions availables to player 1 in information sets 1;3; and 5 respectively. The
extensive description of the strategies is given bellow:
s1 = (withdraw, accept, accept)
s2 = (withdraw, accept, not accept)
s3 = (withdraw, not accept, accept)
s4 = ( withdraw, not accept, not accept)
s5 = (not withdraw, accept, accept)
s6 = (not withdraw, accept, not accept)
s7 = (not withdraw, not accept, accept)
s8 = (not withdraw, not accept, not accept)











j = fa22;a24g such that j = 2;4 and a22 2 A2, a24 2 A4 are the actions
takenby player 2 when he reaches information set 2 and4 respectively. The extensive
description of the strategies is as follows:
s
0
1 = (challenge, challenge)
s
0
2 = (challenge, not challenge)
s
0
3 = (not challenge, challenge)
s
0
4 = (not challenge, not challenge)
The Payo¤ Duelers incur in a cost c = fc;cg for dueling and this cost depends on
the outcome of the duel. The cost is c if the dueler dies and c if the dueler survives
such that 0 < c < c. It is assumed that duelers die or survive with equal probability.




and this information is common knowledge among players.
The ex-ante (before the accusation) value of these honorable men’s lives is3
VH > 0
3Hereafter, whenever we refer to the value of a man we will be talking about his (or his family’s)
creditworthiness.
7If a gentleman is dishonored (that is, if an accusation is made against his honor
or if he falsely accuses someone) the value of his life is reduced by µ - the “cost of
shame” - such that 0 < µ · VH: Hence, the life of a dishonored man is worth
VD = VH ¡µ
Once o¤ended, a man may restore his honor (that is, his creditworthiness) by
challenging the accuser to a duel. The role of a duel is twofold, to restore the honor
and possibly to increase the value of a gentleman’s life. It will be assumed that
the value of an honored and courageous man is higher than the one who, although
honored, has never displayed suchcourage. Thus, ifthe accusedchallenges the accuser
the accused’s payo¤ is:
VC = VH ¡ µ +C
where C > µ is the “value of courage” and VC is the gross value of a courageous
man. C and µ constitute a common knowledge among players.4
If the accuser accepts the challenge he also proves to be a courageous man. In
this case, the payo¤ of each player is5
V
¤
C = VH ¡ µ + C ¡ c
¤
where c¤ is the “cost of dueling” and V ¤
C is the net value of a courageous man.
In the accuser’s payo¤, µ accounts for the cost of being said to be dishonored for
making a false accusation.6
The accused can challenge the accuser even if the accusation is withdrawn. How-
ever, if the accusation is withdrawn and the accused decides not to challenge, the
value of both gentlemen remains as before, that is VH: It will be assumed that what
happened was nothing but a misunderstanding.
We also have to consider the case in which the accuser does not withdraw the
accusation and the accused does not challenge to a duel. If the accused does not …ght
for his honor he is considered a dishonored man and the value of his life is VD: As for
the accuser nothing change and the value of his life is VH:
Solving the game We solve this game by backward induction to …nd the set
strategy pro…les that constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
We start solving subgames that begin with player 1, the accuser, decidingwhether
or not to accept the challenge (see …gure 3a). We will refer to these subgames as the
post-challenge subgames.
4C > µ means that courage always o¤sets any o¤ense made against someone’s honor.
5Recall that o¤enses are taken seriously if and only if it comes from another honorable man.
6The assumption here is that, once the accused challenges the accuser and the latter accepts the
challenge, nobody will ever know if the accusation is true or false. However, both players compensate
the decrease in the value of their lives (µ) by demonstrating that they are courageous men.




VH ¡ µ +C ¡ c
¤ > VH ¡ µ
C ¡ c
¤ > 0
that is, if there is a net positive gain for being courageous. The accuser plays “not
accept” if the net gain is non-positive, that is if
C ¡ c¤ · 0
We now proceed to solve the two subgames that begin with the accused deciding
whether or not to challenge the accuser. We call these subgames the post-withdraw
subgames.
For simplicity’s sake let us focus on the case in which C ¡ c¤ > 0 and so the
accuser accepts7 to duel in the post-challenge subgames: Solving the post-withdraw
subgames we have that, in the left-hand side subgame (…gure 3b shows the reduced




VH ¡ µ + C ¡ c
¤ > VH
C ¡ c¤ > µ
that is, if the net gain for dueling is positive and strictly greater than the “cost
of shame.” The accused plays “not challenge” if
C ¡ c¤ · µ
that is, if the net gain for dueling, though positive, is less than or equal to the
“cost of shame.”
Thus, in the Nash equilibrium of this subgame; asssuming that C ¡ c¤ > 0; the
accuser plays “accept” and the accused plays “challenge” if C ¡ c¤ > µ otherwise
plays “not challenge.”
Solving the subgame on the right-hand side (see …gure 3b), we have that the




C ¡ c¤ > 0




7The procedure to solve the game when C ¡ c¤ · 0 is similar and thus omitted.
9Thus, in the Nash equilibrium of this subgame, the accuser plays “accept” and
the accused plays “challenge.”
Finally, we solve thesubgamethat starts in theinitial nodeandcorresponds tothe
whole game (see …gure 3c for the reduced form game). Using as an example the case
where C¡c¤ > 0, which implies that the accuser accepts the challenge (post-challenge
subgames) and the accused challenges the accuser (post-withdraw subgames) we have
that the accuser is indi¤erent between playing (“withdraw” or “not withdraw”).
The Nash equilibria of the above subgame correspond to the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the whole game. Thus, there are two subgame perfect Nash
equilibria, if C¡c¤ > 0 namely, (i) the accuser withdraws the accusation, the accused
challenges the accuser and the accuser accept the challenge; (ii) the accuser does not
withdraw the accusation, the accuser challenges the accuser and the accuser accept
the challenge.
If C ¡ c¤ · 0, the accused does not accept the challenge in the post-challenge




As we have de…ned earlier in this paper that the above inequality always hold,
the accused will always accuser in the post-withdraw subgame.
As we can see from the above example, the equilibria of the duel game depend on
the parameters C;c¤ and µ. The complete set of equilibrium pro…les is as follows.
Proposition 1 Let ¾ = (S1;S2) be the set of equilibrium pro…le that constitute a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium ofthe duel game, where S1 isthe equilibriumstrategy
played by the accuser and S2 the equilibrium strategy played by the accused. Thus, in
any Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(a) ¾ = ((withdraw,accept, accept);(challenge, challenge)) and ¾ = ((not with-




(b) ¾ = ((withdraw, accept, accept);(not challenge, challenge) is the unique equi-
librium pro…le if and only if
0 < C ¡ c¤ · µ
(c) ¾ = ((withdraw, not accept, not accept),(challenge,challenge)) and ¾ = ((not
withdraw, not accept, not accept),(challenge,challenge)) are the equilibrium pro…les if
and only if
C ¡ c¤ · 0
10Proof. The proof is straight forward and thus is omitted.
Inthe outcomeof the duel gamewe havethat in(a) bothplayers have the incentive
to duel as the value of their lives after the duel will be greater than they were before
(V ¤
C > VH) regardless the outcome of the duel. The accused will challenge the accuser
even if the latter withdraws the accusation. Hence, the accuser will accept the duel
even if he had withdrawn the accusation when he had the opportunity to do so. In
this speci…c case, the “cost of dueling” is su¢ciently low compared to the “value of
courage.”
In (b), players have no incentive to duel as VH > V ¤
C. In other words, the “value
of courage” is not high enough compared to the “cost of dueling”(c¤) . However,
if a challenge is made, the accuser must accept otherwise he would be considered a
dishonored man and VH > V ¤
C > VD:
It seems as though the duel should be avoided as a highest payo¤ is granted when
players do not …ght. The accuser can avoid the duel by withdrawing the accusation
and the accused by not challenging the accuser. Thus, in this case there is no duel
and the payo¤ of both players is VH:
The outcome in(c) is by far the most interesting. In this case the “cost of dueling”
is su¢ciently high compared to the “value of courage.” Hence, both players would
be better o¤ if they do not duel as V ¤
C < VD < VH: It implies that, if challenged,
the accuser - a rational player - will never accept the duel. Knowing that, the best
move for the accused is to challenge the accuser. By doing so, at no cost as the
duel does not occur, the accused not only restores his honor but is also considered a
courageous man (after all, he restores his honor by defying someone to duel when the
cost of …ghting is terribly high!). Thus, the accused payo¤ is VC > VH. The payo¤ of
the accuser, now a dishonored man, is VD < VH: The outcome of the game does not
change whether the accuser withdraws the accusation or not in the begining of the
game.
A high “cost of …ghting” or, alternatively a low “value of courage,” implies that
a man does not necessarily need to be honorable to be successful.
3 Concluding Remarks
Heretofore, game theorists have been interested in the mechanics of dueling, i.e.
strategies about when to shoot. Here, we model the pre-engagement decisions leading
up to the actual combat. We are able to create a model because the classic gentle-
men’ss duel was a very rational a¤air, not a spontaneous outburst of violent emotion.
Basically, gentlemen made calculated decisions about whether to engage in a form of
limited, private war. Although some duels were fought over tangibles resources, like
beautiful women and lucrative o¢ces, most duels centered around “honour,” a cul-
tural code word for creditworthiness. Our three stage, two-players sequential model
describes each logical step of the decision-making process. The model matches the
historical circumstance quite well. Dueling was common where credit markets were
11personal, and hence more oriented on outwards appearances and less oriented on the
examination of audit …nancial statements, the monitoring of restrictive covenants,
and other modern techniques for limiting information asymmetry. In personal mar-
kets, courage and honor were strong signal of creditworthiness, making the “value of
courage” and the “cost of shame” high enough to induce men to risk their lives.
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